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Abstract: Option contracts have been increasingly employed by supply chain firms as a popular strategy to 
hedge against the risk of unanticipated demand. This paper examines the impact of bidirectional option 
contracts on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer taking into consideration of a 
service requirement. We characterize the optimal solutions for the retailer and the supplier with and without 
bidirectional option contracts in the presence of a service requirement. By benchmarking to the model 
without bidirectional option, we explore the effect of bidirectional option contracts on the supply chain. Our 
study shows that the service level with bidirectional option contracts is equivalent to (higher than) that 
without them when the service requirement is (not) binding. In addition, bidirectional option contracts are 
indeed beneficial to both the retailer and the supplier. Furthermore, by investigating the effect of the service 
level on the supply chain, we find that the maximum expected profit of the retailer is non-increasing in the 
service requirement while that of the supplier is non-decreasing in the service requirement, either with or 
without bidirectional option contracts. Finally, a distribution-free coordination condition is proposed to 
achieve the Pareto improvement in the presence of bidirectional option contracts and a service requirement. 
Keywords: Flexibility; Bidirectional option contracts; Supply chain risk management; Coordination; Service 
requirement 
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1. Introduction 
With the hastened technology advancement, an increasing number of products are characterized with a 
relatively shorter life cycle. This phenomenon is particularly prominent in automobile industry, electronics 
industry and high-tech industry. Under such a situation, consumer taste changes at a fast pace and so an 
accurate prediction of the market demand becomes more difficult. To accommodate to the changing market 
environment, companies need to equip with the capability of responding flexibly to high demand uncertainty. 
A typical approach is to use one type of contracts that give the retailer the flexibility in ordering products 
without imposing a burden on the supplier. Among all the contracts, option contracts can effectively resolve 
the conflicts of interest between the supplier and the retailer described above. With option contracts, the 
initial order of the retailer is allowed to be adjusted after the market demand is revealed and the supplier can 
carry out the production schedule more flexibly. Over the past years, option contracts are gradually adopted 
by many well-known companies as a popular strategy in procurement. For example, option contracts are 
adopted by Hewlett-Packard to purchase various components such as memory chips and scanner, which 
account for 35% procurement value (Fu et al., 2010). Most of the products such as mobile phone and 
relevant accessories, which value more than 100 billion RMB, are purchased by China Telecom through 
using option contracts (Chen and Shen, 2012). Option contracts have been demonstrated to be a viable 
alternative to hedge against the risk of unanticipated demand. 
Usually option contracts can be classified into two different types: unilateral and bidirectional. 
Unilateral option contracts are either call or put option contracts. For call option contracts, the retailer can 
reorder a certain quantity of items from the supplier if necessary and the retailer’s initial order can be 
adjusted in the upward direction. For put option contracts, the retailer can return a certain quantity of items to 
the supplier if necessary and the retailer’s initial order can be adjusted in the downward direction. However, 
both call and put options are contained in the bidirectional option contracts, for which, the initial order of the 
retailer can be adjusted in two directions. Obviously, they are an extension of unilateral option contracts 
(Moinzadeh and Nahmias, 2013) and its adoption can provide more flexibility to the retailer in responding to 
the demand volatility. In recent years, bidirectional option contracts have been widely employed in many 
industry sectors in including agricultural products, automobiles and electronics. Recently, through our 
fieldwork in Hainan province of China, we found that some companies specializing in the transaction of 
flowers launch bidirectional option contracts to distribute the flowers to the global customers. Then the 
customers obtain the flowers by the initial order or exercising bidirectional options based on the 
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pre-negotiation. However, companies encountered many issues related to bidirectional option contracts, 
which have not yet been resolved. Motivated by this, this paper attempts to address some important issues of 
bidirectional option contracts. 
Meanwhile, with the increasing market competition, a required service level becomes one of the key 
factors that exert an impact on the purchase choice of consumers. Through promising a service level, 
companies can maintain the market share in the existing market and gain a competitive edge in the new 
market. Many companies are willing to promise a high service level in order to promote the sales of products. 
For example, Pharmed Group (PMG) guarantees that the fill rate of their customer orders is no less than 98% 
(PMG 2006). Costless Express promises that its customers can receive their order on the next-business-day 
(Costless Express 2006). However, the higher service target the companies commit to, the higher risk the 
companies have to undertake. Therefore, how to set an appropriate service target is critical for a company to 
balance the customer satisfaction and the expected profit. Motivated by this, the service level related issues 
are also incorporated in this study. 
In this paper, the procurement and production problems are discussed in a supply chain setting that one 
supplier manufactures one type of products with limited product life and distributes them to the market via 
one retailer. To enhance customer satisfaction, the retailer commits to a service target that is provided to the 
customers. Moreover, to hedge against the risk associated to uncertain demand, bidirectional option contracts 
are employed by the retailer when purchasing products from the supplier. This study addresses the problem 
referring to the optimal operational decisions and the maximum expected profits of the retailer and the 
supplier in the presence of bidirectional option contracts and a required service level. Several key questions 
are address in this paper:  
 How do bidirectional option contracts affect the supply chain?  
 What effect does the service level have on the supply chain?  
 What is the condition for coordinating the supply chain with bidirectional option contracts and required 
service level? 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. A review of option contracts and the service 
requirement related literature is provided in section 2. The model assumptions and formulation are provided 
in section 3. In the next section, we derive the optimal decision policies for both the retailer and the supplier 
respectively with bidirectional option contracts and a required service level. In section 5, we discuss the 
effect of bidirectional option contracts and the service level requirement on the supply chain. In section 6, we 
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examine the condition for the supply chain coordination in the presence of bidirectional option contracts and 
a required service level. In section 7, some directions for further research are provided. 
 
2. Literature review 
To highlight the work of this paper, the related literature is reviewed in two important research streams: (1) 
option contracts and (2) models with a service requirement. 
The research referring to option contracts has drawn considerable attentions in the past 15 years. 
Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) introduce real options into the supply chain management research for the first 
time. They prove that the two-period channel coordination with correlated demand is achievable in the 
presence of call option contracts when the exercise price is restricted to be linear. Burnetas and Ritchken 
(2005) analyze the change that occurs on both the wholesale price and the retail price after using call option 
contracts when consumers have a downward sloping demand. Wang and Tsao (2006) study the optimal 
behavior of the buyer with bidirectional option contracts. They prove that the adoption of bidirectional 
option contracts can enhance the buyer’s profitability under the condition of uniformly distributed demand. 
Wang and Liu (2007) analyze the coordination issue of a supply chain with call option contracts when the 
dominant position of the market is taken by the retailer. Gomez_Padilla and Mishina (2009) show that 
bidirectional option contracts benefit both the members and the chain where multiple suppliers and one 
retailer are the members. They also obtain the same results for a supply chain that only includes one supplier 
and one retailer. Fu et al. (2010) study the single-period portfolio procurement problem with call option 
contracts and spot market, and then extend to the case of multi-period procurement. Xia et al. (2011) explore 
how to employ option and firm order contracts to share the risks of supply and demand. They demonstrate 
that the reliable supplier is always preferred by the buyer and placing pre-orders can improve the supplier’s 
operations. Liu et al. (2013) introduce both unilateral and bidirectional option contracts into the container 
planning problem. They study the application strategies of different option contracts in different practical 
scenarios. Chen et al. (2014) investigate the coordination issue of a supply chain considering a loss-averse 
retailer and call option contracts. All of the related literature mainly focuses on call option contracts and the 
literature on bidirectional option contracts is relatively rare. Moreover, all of the related literature does not 
consider the service requirement and its impacts. 
The research referring to models with a service requirement has also inspired numerous studies over the 
past years. Bernstein and Federgruen (2007) develop a mechanism that combines wholesale price contracts 
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and back-logging penalties to coordinate a supply chain, in which, customer demand is dependent on price 
and service level. Sethi et al. (2007) analyze the problem of the buyer’s procurement with a service target 
and demand forecast updating. They show that the coordination of the supply chain is available in the 
presence of buyback contracts. Katok et al. (2008) demonstrate that the supply chain can be coordinated by 
service-level commitment contracts. They also explore the impact of the review period length and the impact 
of the bonus quantity on the optimal inventory level. Li et al. (2011) derive the optimal solutions of the two 
inventory optimization models with a required service level and then propose a price discount mechanism to 
acheve supply chain coordination. Sieke et al. (2012) propose two types of supply contracts with a service 
requirement to coordinate the partners’ activities within a supply chain. Xiao and Xu (2013) obtain the 
optimal solutions referring to the price and the service level and then develop a revenue-sharing mechanism 
for the supply chain coordination under vendor-managed inventory (VMI). Jha and Shanker (2013) present a 
production-inventory model of a supply chain that is made of one vendor and multiple buyers, taking into 
consideration of lead time reduction and service level constraints. Heydari (2014) investigates the 
relationship between the supplier’s lead time and the chain’s service level. They develop a coordination 
mechanism with per order extra payment to coordinate the supplier's replenishment decision with stochastic 
lead time and a service requirement. All of the related literature does not consider option contracts and its 
impacts. 
Our work is an extension of the work of Zhao et al. (2013) and Chen and Shen (2012). In analyzing the 
optimal ordering strategy of the retailer with bidirectional option contracts, Zhao et al. (2013) provide the 
condition on which the supply chain can be coordinated. However, their study only focuses on the retailer’s 
ordering behavior. Since the supplier is assumed to manufacture the items up to the retailer’s order quantity, 
the supplier’s production behavior is not considered in their paper. Moreover, their study only examines the 
impact of bidirectional option contracts on the retailer’s initial order but never explore its impact on the 
retailer’s maximum expected profit, let alone its impact on the supplier’s maximum expected profit. 
Furthermore, their study does not incorporate the service requirement into their model. Chen and Shen (2012) 
demonstrate that the adoption of call option contracts can improve the expected profits for the two members 
when there is a service requirement. They also explore the effect of the service level on the maximum 
expected profits for both the retailer and the supplier in the presence of call option contracts. However, they 
research only considers call option contracts. As we know, bidirectional options contracts are regarded as an 
extension of unilateral options contracts. A series of issues involving bidirectional option contracts have not 
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been addressed. Different from these above research, this paper incorporate bidirectional option contracts 
and service requirement into the model. We analyze the optimal decision policies for both the retailer and the 
supplier with bidirectional option contracts and a required service level. We also investigate the effect of the 
above two factors on the supply chain. On the basis, we derive the condition on which the supply chain can 
achieve coordination in the presence of bidirectional option contracts and a required service level.  
 
3. Model assumptions and formulation  
This paper considers a one-period two-echelon supply chain, in which the supplier manufactures a type of 
short life products and sells them via the retailer. The short life products, subjecting to uncertain further 
market demand, are characterized by a long lead-time and a short selling period. For this reason, the retailer 
is not able to replenish his inventory during the selling season. Moreover, in order to promote the sales of 
products, the retailer commits to a service target to the consumers. For this reason, the retailer should order 
enough quantity to enhance the probability of satisfying the market demand.  
The variables and model parameters are defined as the notations presented in Table 1. 
Tab. 1 Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
𝐷 The stochastic market demand. 
𝑓(𝑥) Probability density function for 𝐷. 
𝐹(𝑥) Distribution function for 𝐷, which is differentiable, invertible and strictly increasing.  
𝑝 Unit retail price. 
𝑤1 Unit wholesale price of the product. 
𝑏 Unit purchase price of the bidirectional option. 
𝑤2 Unit exercise price of the bidirectional option. 
𝑐 Unit production cost. 
𝑠 Units salvage value. 
𝑔 Supplier’s unit penalty cost for each exercised bidirectional option which cannot be immediately satisfied 
𝛼 Retailer’s service level commitment. Note 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
𝑞1 Retailer’s firm order quantity with bidirectional options contracts. 
𝑞0 Retailer’s firm order quantity without bidirectional options contracts. 
𝑞2 Retailer’s bidirectional options order quantity. 
𝑞 Retailer’s total order quantity with bidirectional options contracts.  
𝑄 Supplier’s production quantity with bidirectional options contracts.  
𝑄0 Supplier’s production quantity without bidirectional options contracts.  
𝜋𝑟(𝑞1, 𝑞2) Retailer’s expected profit with bidirectional options contracts and without a service requirement. 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞0) Retailer’s expected profit without bidirectional options contracts and a service requirement. 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄) Supplier’s expected profit with bidirectional options contracts and without a service requirement. 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄0) Supplier’s expected profit without bidirectional options contracts. 
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𝑞1
𝛾
 
Retailer’s optimal firm order quantity with bidirectional options contracts and without a service 
requirement. 
𝑞0
𝛽
 Retailer’s optimal firm order quantity without bidirectional options contracts and a service requirement. 
𝑞2
𝛾
 Retailer’s optimal bidirectional options order quantity without a service requirement. 
𝑞𝛾 
Retailer’s optimal total order quantity with bidirectional options contracts and without a service 
requirement. Note, 𝑞𝛾 = 𝑞1
𝛾 + 𝑞2
𝛾
. 
𝑄𝜆 
Supplier’s optimal production quantity with bidirectional options contracts and without a service 
requirement.  
𝑞2
∗ Retailer’s optimal bidirectional options order quantity with a service requirement. 
𝑞∗ Retailer’s optimal total order quantity with bidirectional options contracts and a service requirement. 
𝑞0
∗ 
Retailer’s optimal firm order quantity without bidirectional options contracts and with a service 
requirement. 
𝑄∗ 
Supplier’s optimal production quantity with bidirectional options contracts and a service requirement. 
Note, 𝑞1
𝛾 < 𝑄∗ < 𝑞∗. 
𝑄0
∗ 
Supplier’s optimal production quantity without bidirectional options contracts and with a service 
requirement. Note, 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
∗. 
The decision process of the model with bidirectional options contracts is illustrated in Figure 1. Before 
the start of the selling season, the retailer places an initial order 𝑞1 at unit wholesale price 𝑤1 and 
purchases a certain amount of bidirectional options 𝑞2 at unit purchase price 𝑏. Each bidirectional option 
provides the retailer with the right, not the obligation, to reorder or return one extra item after the market 
demand has been observed. After that, the supplier produces the products up to 𝑄 based on the retailer’s 
order quantity and the stochastic demand. At the start of the selling season, the firm order is delivered 
immediately to the retailer. During the selling season, the retailer exercises the bidirectional options as either 
the call options or the put options based on the realized market demand at unit exercise price 𝑤2. Any 
leftovers owned by either the retailer or the supplier can be salvaged at the end of the selling period. 
 
Fig. 1 The decision process with bidirectional options contracts 
The supply chain members are assumed to be rational and neutral. The information available is 
symmetric between the two parties. All the bidirectional options are settled by physical delivery of product 
rather than cash payment. This assumption ensures that the retailer has to consider the realized market 
demand and never exercises all the bidirectional options just to gain benefit from the penalty costs. Thus, the 
Supplier delivers the 
firm order 
Supplier decides the 
production quantity Q 
Retailer orders products 
𝑞1 and buys bidirectional 
options 𝑞2 
Retailer exercises the 
bidirectional options 
Selling season 
𝑡0 𝑡1 𝑡2 
Lead time 
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unit penalty cost 𝑔 denotes the cost involved in accelerating production or obtaining products from an 
alternative source. 
To avoid the trivialities, the contract parameters are assumed to satisfy the following conditions 
throughout this paper.  
(1) 𝑤1 − 𝑏 < 𝑤2 < 𝑤1 + 𝑏. The first part of this condition ensures that the costs of obtaining one 
products are higher with bidirectional option contracts than without them because bidirectional option 
contracts provide the retailer flexibility in responding to the market variation. Otherwise, the retailer has no 
motivation to use wholesale price contracts to obtain the goods from the supplier. The second part of this 
condition avoids that the retailer deliberately orders more bidirectional options. Otherwise, it is always 
profitable for the retailer to purchase bidirectional options.  
(2) 𝑝 − 𝑤2 > 𝑤2 − 𝑠. This condition ensures that the retailer must satisfy the market when the demand 
occurs, not return the products to the supplier.  
(3) 𝑝 − 𝑐 > 𝑐 − 𝑠. This condition ensures that the opportunity revenue is greater than the opportunity 
loss. Otherwise, the supplier has no incentive to manufacture the products.  
(4) 𝑔 > 𝑐 > 𝑠. The fourth condition ensures that the unit production cost is lower than the unit penalty 
cost, but higher than the unit salvage value.  
(5) In our study, similar to Zhao et al. (2013), the allowance paid for exercising one unit of bidirectional 
option as one unit of call option is supposed to be the same as the refund obtained from exercising one unit 
of bidirectional option as one unit of put option. Notation 𝑥+ = max(0, 𝑥). 
 
4. Optimal decisions with bidirectional option contracts  
In this section, a model with bidirectional option contracts is formulated and the optimal ordering and 
production policies are analyzed for both the retailer and the supplier.  
4.1 Optimal ordering policy with bidirectional option contracts 
First, the optimal ordering policy of the retailer is analyzed with bidirectional option contracts and a service 
requirement. In this context, two decision variables are considered including: the firm order quantity 𝑞1 and 
the bidirectional option order quantity 𝑞2.  
With bidirectional option contracts, the retailer’s expected profit without a service requirement is  
𝜋𝑟(𝑞1, 𝑞2) = 𝑝𝐸[min(𝑞1 + 𝑞2, 𝐷)] + 𝑠𝐸[(𝑞1 − 𝑞2 − 𝐷)
+] + 𝑤2𝐸[min(𝑞2, (𝑞1 − 𝐷)
+)]
− 𝑤2𝐸[min(𝑞2, (𝐷 − 𝑞1)
+)] − 𝑏𝑞2 − 𝑤1𝑞1 
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The first three terms are the expected revenue, the salvage value of unsold products and the incomes 
realized from exercising the bidirectional options as the put options, respectively. The last three terms 
capture the costs of exercising the bidirectional options as the call options, purchasing bidirectional options 
and ordering the products, respectively. Then, 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞1, 𝑞2) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞1 + (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞2 − (𝑝 − 𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞1+𝑞2
0
  
−(𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞1−𝑞2
0
                                 (1) 
Thus, the decision problem faced by the retailer with bidirectional option contracts and a service 
requirement is 
max
𝑞1≥0,𝑞2≥0
𝜋𝑟(𝑞1, 𝑞2) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑃𝑟{𝑞 ≥ 𝐷} ≥ 𝛼                               (2) 
From (2), we derive that 𝑞 ≥ 𝐹−1(𝛼) and 𝑞𝛼 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛼). It’s clear that 𝑞𝛼 is an increasing function 
of 𝛼.  
Lemma 1 With bidirectional option contracts, the retailer’s expected profit without a service 
requirement 𝝅𝒓(𝒒𝟏, 𝒒𝟐) is jointly concave in 𝒒𝟏 and 𝒒𝟐. 
From this lemma, we conclude that without a service requirement the retailer has a unique optimal 
ordering policy under portfolio contracts with bidirectional options. Then, with bidirectional option contracts 
the retailer’s optimal firm order quantity without a service requirement is 
𝑞1
𝛾 =
1
2
[𝐹−1 (
2𝑝−𝑤1−𝑤2−𝑏
2𝑝−2𝑤2
) + 𝐹−1 (
𝑤2+𝑏−𝑤1
2𝑤2−2𝑠
)]                    (3) 
The retailer’s optimal bidirectional options order quantity without a service requirement is 
𝑞2
𝛾 =
1
2
[𝐹−1 (
2𝑝−𝑤1−𝑤2−𝑏
2𝑝−2𝑤2
) − 𝐹−1 (
𝑤2+𝑏−𝑤1
2𝑤2−2𝑠
)]                    (4) 
The retailer’s optimal total order quantity without a service requirement is 
𝑞𝛾 = 𝐹−1 (
2𝑝−𝑤1−𝑤2−𝑏
2𝑝−2𝑤2
)                             (5) 
The above results are constant with Theorem 1 of Zhao et al. (2013) except that the lost sales penalty is 
not considered here. Set 𝛾 = (2𝑝 − 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏) (2𝑝 − 2𝑤2)⁄ , which represents the maximum service 
level with bidirectional option contracts when there is no service requirement. Then, we obtain that 𝑞𝛾 ≡
𝐹−1(𝛾).  
10 
 
Since 𝑞𝛾 > 𝑞1
𝛾
, we obtain that 𝑏 < (𝑝−𝑤1)(𝑤2−𝑠)+(𝑝−𝑤2)(𝑤1−𝑠)
𝑝−𝑠
. This inequality implies that if the supplier 
charges a high purchase price of bidirectional options, the retailer will never purchase any number of 
bidirectional options. 
Regarding the retailer’s optimal ordering policy with bidirectional option contracts and a service 
requirement, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 With bidirectional option contracts, the retailer’s optimal total order quantity with a 
service requirement satisfies 
𝒒∗ = {
𝒒𝜸 𝒊𝒇 𝜶 ≤ 𝜸
𝒒𝜶 𝒊𝒇 𝜶 > 𝜸
                                (6) 
and his optimal bidirectional options order quantity with a service requirement is 
𝒒𝟐
∗ = 𝒒∗ − 𝒒𝟏
𝜸
                                 (7) 
This proposition shows that there is an obvious difference between the retailer’s optimal ordering 
policies either with or without a service requirement considering bidirectional option contracts. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾 
then 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞2
∗ = 𝑞2
𝛾
. If 𝛼 > 𝛾 then 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞2
∗ ≠ 𝑞2
𝛾
. 
Now we explore the effect of 𝑤1 on the retailer’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement, which brings about the following corollary. 
Corollary 1 With bidirectional option contracts, the retailer’s maximum expected profit with a service 
requirement is a decreasing function of 𝒘𝟏. 
This corollary shows that considering bidirectional option contracts and a service requirement, the 
retailer’s maximum expected profit is significantly influenced by the changes in the unit wholesale price. If 
the unit wholesale price increases, the retailer will generate a lower expected profit with bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement. Otherwise, the retailer will gain a higher expected profit. 
4.2 Optimal production policy with bidirectional option contracts 
Subsequently, we consider the optimal production policy of the supplier with bidirectional option contracts 
and a service requirement. Since the make-to-order production pattern is not adopted by the supplier, with 
bidirectional option contracts and a service requirement, the supplier’s production quantity satisfies 𝑞1
𝛾 <
𝑄 < 𝑞∗.  
With bidirectional option contracts, the supplier’s expected profit without a service requirement is 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄) = 𝑤1𝑞1
𝛾 + 𝑏(𝑞∗ − 𝑞1
𝛾) + 𝑠𝐸[min(𝑄 − (2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞∗) , (𝑄 − 𝑥)+)] + 𝑤2𝐸 [min (𝑞
∗ − 𝑞1
𝛾 , (𝐷 − 𝑞1
𝛾)
+
)] −
𝑤2𝐸 [min (𝑞
∗ − 𝑞1
𝛾 , (𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝐷)
+
)] − 𝑐𝑄 − 𝑔𝐸[(min(𝐷, 𝑞∗) − 𝑄)+]   
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The first four terms capture the income s realized from the firm order, the bidirectional options order, 
the salvaged unsold product and exercising the bidirectional options as the put options, respectively. The last 
three terms are the costs of exercising the bidirectional options as the call options, the production costs and 
the penalty costs, respectively. Then, 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄) = (𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑔)𝑞
∗ + (𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞1
𝛾 − (𝑤2 − 𝑔) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞∗
0
𝑑𝑥  
+(𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
2𝑞1
𝛾
−𝑞∗
0
𝑑𝑥 + (𝑔 − 𝑐)𝑄 − (𝑔 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄
0
       (8) 
Thus, the decision problem faced by the supplier with bidirectional option contracts and a service 
requirement is  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄
𝜋𝑠(𝑄) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑞1
𝛾 ≤ 𝑄 ≤ 𝑞∗                               (9) 
Lemma 2 With bidirectional option contracts, the supplier’s expected profit without a service 
requirement 𝝅𝒔(𝑸) is concave in 𝑸. 
From this lemma, we conclude that without constraints the supplier has a unique optimal production 
policy under portfolio contracts with bidirectional options. Then, with bidirectional option contracts the 
supplier’s optimal production quantity 𝑄𝜆 without a service requirement is 
𝑄𝜆 = 𝐹−1 (𝑔−𝑐
𝑔−𝑠
)                                 (10) 
Set 𝜆 = (𝑔 − 𝑐) (𝑔 − 𝑠)⁄ . Then, we obtain that 𝑄𝜆 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝜆).  
As to the supplier’s optimal production policy with bidirectional option contracts and a service 
requirement, the following proposition is derived. 
Proposition 2 With bidirectional option contracts, the supplier’s optimal production quantity with a 
service requirement satisfies  
𝑸∗ = {
𝒒𝟏
𝜸 𝒊𝒇 𝑸𝝀 ≤ 𝒒𝟏
𝜸
𝑸𝝀 𝒊𝒇 𝒒𝟏
𝜸 < 𝑸𝝀 < 𝒒∗
𝒒∗ 𝒊𝒇 𝑸𝝀 ≥ 𝒒∗
                          (11) 
This proposition shows that with bidirectional option contracts and a service requirement, the supplier’s 
optimal production quantity is an interval. If 𝑄𝜆 ≤ 𝑞1
𝛾
 then 𝑄∗ = 𝑞1
𝛾
. If 𝑞1
𝛾 < 𝑄𝜆 ≤ 𝑞∗ then 𝑄∗ = 𝑄𝜆. If 
𝛼 ≤ 𝛾 and 𝑞∗ ≤ 𝑄𝜆 then 𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛾. If 𝛼 > 𝛾 and 𝑞∗ ≤ 𝑄𝜆 then 𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛼.  
Now we explore the effect of 𝑤1 on the supplier’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement, which leading to the following corollary. 
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Corollary 2 When 𝜶 > 𝜸 , the supplier’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement is an increasing function of 𝒘𝟏. 
This corollary shows that when the service requirement is binding (𝛼 > 𝛾), the supplier’s maximum 
expected profit with bidirectional option contracts will increase as the unit wholesale price increases. 
Recalling corollary 1, we conclude that when the service requirement is binding, an increase in the unit 
wholesale price will induce a rise in the supplier’s maximum expected profit and the decrease in that of the 
retailer with bidirectional option contracts.  
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 The case without bidirectional option contracts 
In this section, we formulate a model without bidirectional option contracts and then take this model as a 
benchmark to explore the effect of bidirectional option contracts and the service level on the supply chain.  
We assume that the retailer only places a firm order 𝑞0 from the supplier. Without bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement, the retailer’s expected profit is  
𝜋𝑟(𝑞0) = 𝑝𝐸[min(𝑞0, 𝐷)] + 𝑠𝐸[(𝑞0 − 𝐷)
+] − 𝑤1𝑞0 
The first two terms are the expected revenue and the salvage value of unsold products. The last term is 
the costs of ordering the products. Then,  
𝜋𝑟(𝑞0) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞0 − (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
0
                    (12) 
Thus, the decision problem faced by the retailer without bidirectional option contracts in the presence of 
service requirement is  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞0≥0
𝜋𝑟(𝑞0)  
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑃𝑟{𝑞0 ≥ 𝐷} ≥ 𝛼                             (13) 
From (13), we derive that 𝑞0 ≥ 𝐹
−1(𝛼) and 𝑞𝛼 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛼). It is clear that 𝑞𝛼  is an increasing 
function of 𝛼. 
From (12), we obtain that 𝑑𝜋𝑟
(𝑞0)
𝑑𝑞0
= (𝑝 − 𝑤1) − (𝑝 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑞0)  and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑞0)
𝑑𝑞0
2 = −(𝑝 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑞0) < 0 . 
Obviously, 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0) is concave in 𝑞0. Hence, we conclude that without a service requirement the retailer has 
a unique optimal ordering policy under wholesale price contracts. Then, without bidirectional option 
contracts and as service requirement, the retailer’s optimal firm order quantity is  
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𝑞0
𝛽
= 𝐹−1 (
𝑝−𝑤1
𝑝−𝑠
)                               (14) 
Set 𝛽 = (𝑝 − 𝑤1) (𝑝 − 𝑠)⁄ , which represents the maximum service level without bidirectional option 
contracts when there is no service requirement. Then, we obtain that 𝑞0
𝛽
≡ 𝐹−1(𝛽).  
Without bidirectional option contracts, the retailer’s optimal firm order quantity in the presence of a 
service requirement is 
𝑞0
∗ = {
𝑞0
𝛽
𝑖𝑓 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽
𝑞𝛼 𝑖𝑓 𝛼 > 𝛽
                             (15) 
Recalling (13), without bidirectional option contracts the retailer’s maximum expected profit in the 
presence of a service requirement is 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞0
∗ − (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
∗
0
. When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽, we obtain 
that 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞0
𝛽
. In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗) is a constant function of 𝛼. When 𝛼 > 𝛽, we obtain that 
𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼 . In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗) is a decreasing function of 𝛼 . In conclusion, without 
bidirectional option contracts the retailer’s maximum expected profit in the presence a service requirement is 
a non-increasing function of 𝛼. 
We assume that the supplier’s production quantity is 𝑄0. When the selling season begins, the supplier 
must deliver the firm order to the retailer. Hence, the supplier’s optimal production quantity satisfies 𝑄0
∗ =
𝑞0
∗. Without bidirectional option contracts, the supplier’s expected profit in the presence of a service 
requirement is  
𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) = (𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑄0
∗ = (𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑞0
∗                       (16) 
When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽, we obtain that 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
𝛽
. In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) is a constant function of 𝛼. 
When 𝛼 > 𝛽, we obtain that 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) is a increasing function of 𝛼. In 
conclusion, without bidirectional option contracts the supplier’s maximum expected profit in the presence of 
a service requirement is a non-decreasing function of 𝛼. 
5.2 The effect of bidirectional option contracts 
First, we consider the effect of bidirectional option contracts on the retailer’s optimal ordering policy, which 
yields the following proposition.  
Proposition 3 If 𝜶 ≤ 𝜸, then 𝒒∗ > 𝒒𝟎
∗ . If 𝜶 > 𝜸 then 𝒒∗ = 𝒒𝟎
∗ .  
This proposition shows that the introduction of bidirectional option contracts has a remarkable impact 
on the retailer’s optimal total order quantity. When the service requirement is not binding (𝛼 ≤ 𝛾), the 
retailer’s optimal total order quantity is greater with bidirectional option contracts than without them, 
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meaning that the service level should be improved to a higher level after adopting bidirectional option 
contracts. When the service requirement is binding (𝛼 > 𝛾), the retailer’s optimal total order quantity with 
bidirectional option contracts is equivalent to that without them, meaning that the service level should be still 
maintained at the original level after adopting bidirectional option contracts. It follows that the usage of 
bidirectional option contracts can help the retailer to improve the service level when there is no service 
requirement and maintain the service level when there is a service requirement.  
We depict this proposition in figure 2, in which, 𝛽  represents the maximum service level 
corresponding to the retailer’s optimal firm order quantity without bidirectional option contracts and a 
service requirement. 𝛾 represents the maximum service level corresponding to the retailer’s optimal total 
order quantity with bidirectional option contracts and without a service requirement. Moreover, we see that 
𝛾 is always greater than 𝛽 when there is no service requirement, which implies that the maximum service 
level is higher with bidirectional option contracts than without them. 
 
Fig. 2 Relationships between 𝒒∗ and 𝒒𝟎
∗  
Now we explore the effect of bidirectional option contracts on the maximum expected profits of the 
retailer and the supplier, which leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 4 The maximum expected profits of the retailer and the supplier are both greater with 
bidirectional option contracts than without them. 
This proposition demonstrates that bidirectional option contracts benefit the retailer. The main reason is 
because the retailer has the right to obtain the additional products or return the partial leftovers by exercising 
the bidirectional options as the call or put options according to the realized market demand. Hence, the 
retailer can flexibly respond to the demand volatility, which results in an increase in his maximum expected 
𝑞 
𝛼 𝛽 
𝑞0
∗ 
𝑞∗ 
𝛾 
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profit. Furthermore, this proposition proves that bidirectional option contracts are also beneficial for the 
supplier. This is due to the reason that the supplier has the right to arrange the production schedule based on 
the retailer’s order quantity of two types including the firm order and the bidirectional options order, and the 
stochastic market demand. Hence, the supplier can flexibly meet the irregular order, which leads to an 
increase in his maximum expected profit. In conclusion, the above proposition indicates that both the retailer 
and the supplier are better off in adopting bidirectional option contracts. Obviously, the usage of bidirectional 
option contracts can improve the supply chain members’ individual performances and therefore achieve the 
win-win outcomes.  
Recalling Zhao et al. (2013), they only consider the stochastic demand but neglect the service 
requirement. It indicates the relevant results in their paper, such as the retailer’s optimal ordering policy 
without a service requirement, can be seemed as a special case for our study. In addition, they do not 
consider the variation on the retailer’s maximum expected profit after adopting bidirectional option contracts. 
Thus, an important managerial implication for the retailer working in the circumstance that is similar to our 
study has not been pointed out. That is, bidirectional option contracts are more profitable than wholesale 
price contracts to the retailer. Furthermore, they never consider the supplier’s optimal production policy, let 
alone the variation on the supplier’s maximum expected profit after adopting bidirectional option contracts. 
Thus, our paper can be seems as an extension of their paper to a more complex and realistic supply chain 
environment.  
5.3 The effect of the service level 
Now we explore the effect of the service level on the maximum expected profits of the retailer and the 
supplier, which yields the following proposition.  
Proposition 5 With bidirectional option contract, the retailer’s maximum expected profit is a 
non-increasing function of the service requirement 𝜶 while the supplier’s maximum expected profit is a 
non-decreasing function of the service requirement 𝜶. 
This proposition shows that the service requirement made a substantial impact on the retailer’s 
maximum expected profit. If the retailer has a desire to achieve higher expected profit, the customer has to 
face a lower service level. If the customer requires a higher service level, the retailer has to achieve lower 
expected profit. Obviously, it is important for the retailer to choose an appropriate service target. 
Furthermore, this proposition shows that the service requirement also has a significant impact on the 
supplier’s maximum expected profit. If the supplier has a desire to achieve higher expected profit, the retailer 
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faces a higher service level. If the retailer faces a lower service level, the supplier has to generate lower 
expected profit. Obviously, it is important for the supplier to induce the retailer to increase his order and aim 
for a higher service level.  
We depict the relationships between 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗), 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) and 𝛼 in figure 3. From the following figure, 
we see that when the service requirement is not binding (𝛼 ≤ 𝛾), the retailer’s maximum expected profit with 
bidirectional option contracts is constant in 𝛼. When the service requirement is binding (𝛼 > 𝛾), the 
retailer’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option contracts is decreasing in 𝛼. Moreover, we see 
that with a service requirement the retailer’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option contracts is 
greater than without them. Hence, when there is a service requirement, the retailer’s maximum expected 
profit without or with bidirectional option contracts is non-increasing in 𝛼.  
 
Fig. 3 Relationship between 𝝅𝒓(𝒒
∗, 𝒒𝟏
∗ ), 𝝅𝒓(𝒒𝟎
∗ ) and 𝜶 
We depict the relationships between 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗), 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) and 𝛼 in figure 4. From the following figure, 
we see that when the service requirement is not binding (𝛼 ≤ 𝛾), the supplier’s maximum expected profit 
with bidirectional option contracts is constant in 𝛼. When the service requirement is binding (𝛼 > 𝛾), the 
supplier’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option contracts is increasing in 𝛼. Moreover, we see 
that with a service requirement the supplier’s maximum expected profit is greater with bidirectional option 
contracts than without them. Hence, when there is a service requirement, the supplier’s maximum expected 
profit without or with bidirectional option contracts is non-decreasing in 𝛼.  
Retailer’s profit 
 
𝛼 𝛽 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗) 
𝛾 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) 
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Fig. 4 Relationship between 𝝅𝒔(𝑸
∗), 𝝅𝒔(𝑸𝟎
∗ ) and 𝜶 
Recalling Chen and Shen (2012), the similar optimization problems with a service requirement are 
taken into account. The major difference between their model and ours is that they consider call option 
contracts while we consider bidirectional option contracts. By comparing with the relevant results in the 
mentioned-above paper, the following conclusions can be derived. First, in comparison with wholesale price 
contracts, either call or bidirectional option contracts will increase the individual members’ maximum 
expected profits. Next, with either call or bidirectional option contracts, the retailer’s maximum expected 
profit is non-increasing in the service requirement 𝛼 while the supplier’s maximum expected profit is 
non-decreasing in the service requirement 𝛼. Such conclusions are sufficient to support the following point. 
That is, bidirectional option contracts are a natural extension of call option contracts.  
 
6. Supply chain coordination 
In this section, we address the problem of the supply chain coordination with bidirectional option contracts 
and a service requirement.  
We take the members of the supply chain as an entity and study the centralized system’s optimal 
production policy with a service requirement. We assume that the centralized system’s production quantity is 
𝑄𝐼. Then, the expected profit of the centralized system, denoted Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼), is  
Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼) = 𝑝𝐸[min(𝑄𝐼 , 𝐷)] + 𝑠𝐸[(𝑄𝐼 − 𝐷)
+] − 𝑐𝑄𝐼 − 𝑔𝐸[(𝐷 − 𝑄𝐼)
+] 
The first two terms are the expected revenue and the salvage value of unsold products. The last two 
terms capture the production costs and the penalty costs. Then,  
Supplier’s profit 
 
𝛼 𝛽 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) 
 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) 
𝛾 
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Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼) = (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑐)𝑄𝐼 − 𝑔𝜇 − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄𝐼
0
              (17) 
Thus, the decision problem faced by the centralized system in the presence of a service requirement is  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝐼≥0
𝛱𝐼(𝑄𝐼) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑃𝑟{𝑄𝐼 ≥ 𝐷} ≥ 𝛼                             (18) 
From (18), we derive that 𝑞 ≥ 𝐹−1(𝛼) and 𝑞𝛼 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛼). It’s clear that 𝑞𝛼 is an increasing function 
of 𝛼. 
Lemma 3 Without a service requirement, the centralized system’s expected profit 𝚷𝑰(𝑸𝑰) is concave 
in 𝑸𝑰. 
From this lemma, we conclude that without a service requirement the centralized system has a unique 
optimal production policy. Then, without a service requirement the centralized system’s optimal production 
quantity is 
𝑄𝐼
𝜏 = 𝐹−1 (𝑝+𝑔−𝑐
𝑝+𝑔−𝑠
)                              (19) 
Set 𝜏 = (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑐) (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑠)⁄ , which represents the maximum service level when there is no service 
requirement. Then, we obtain that 𝑄𝐼
𝜏 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝜏).  
Regarding the optimal production quantity of the centralized system in the presence of a service 
requirement, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 6 With a service requirement, the centralized system’s optimal production quantity is 
𝑸𝑰
∗ = {
𝑸𝑰
𝝉 𝒊𝒇 𝜶 ≤ 𝝉
𝒒𝜶 𝒊𝒇 𝜶 > 𝜏
                             (20) 
From this proposition, we find that with a service requirement the centralized system’s optimal 
production quantity is an interval. When the service requirement are not binding (𝛼 ≤ 𝛾), we obtain that 
𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑄𝐼
𝜏. In this case, we derive that Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼
∗) is a constant function of 𝛼. When the service requirement are 
binding (𝛼 > 𝛾), we obtain that 𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. In this case, we derive that Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼
∗) is a decreasing function of 𝛼. 
In conclusion, with a service requirement the centralized system’s maximum expected profit is a 
non-increasing function of 𝛼. We have the following insight. 
Proposition 7 With a service requirement, The centralized system’s optimal service level is 𝜶∗ =
𝒑+𝒈−𝒄
𝒑+𝒈−𝒔
. 
The above proposition shows that the optimal service level is the maximum service level corresponding 
to the centralized system’s optimal production quantity without a service requirement. 
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Subsequently, we consider the coordination condition for a supply chain with bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement. The following proposition is derived. 
Proposition 8 With a service requirement, Portfolio contracts with bidirectional options that satisfy 
𝒘𝟏 = 𝒘𝟐 − 𝒃 +
𝟐(𝟏−𝜶)(𝒑+𝒈−𝒔)(𝒑−𝒘𝟐)
𝒈−𝒔
 can coordinate the supply chain. 
This proposition shows that the coordination condition of a supply chain with bidirectional option 
contracts and a service requirement is determined by the unit retail price, the unit wholesale price, the unit 
purchase and exercise prices of bidirectional options. Moreover, we see that this coordination condition is 
independent with the probability density function for the stochastic market demand, that is a distribution-free 
coordination condition. Thus, this feature makes this coordination condition easier to be implemented in 
practice. Furthermore, we see that the expected profits of both the retailer and the supplier with the 
coordinating contracts are at least the same as those without. Obviously, when there is a service requirement, 
there always exists a Pareto improvement with bidirectional option contracts. 
 
7. Conclusions  
In this study, we explore the procurement and production problems for a perishable supply chain with 
bidirectional option contracts and a service requirement. We take into consideration a supplier-retailer supply 
chain system, in which the supplier manufactures a type of short life products and the retailer, who commits 
to a service target to the customers and satisfies the unanticipated demand through the firm order and the 
bidirectional options order. To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first research that examines the 
value of bidirectional option contracts and service level to the supply chain risk management. Our work 
provides several interesting observations. 
Observation 1: With bidirectional option contracts, there is an optimal ordering policy for the retailer 
in the presence of a service requirement. In a similar condition, there also exists an optimal production policy 
for the supplier. Therefore, the members of a supply chain can adopt the appropriate decision policies based 
on our findings to maximize their expected profits with bidirectional option contracts and a required service 
level. 
Observation 2: Our finding shows that the adoption of bidirectional option contracts has a significant 
impact on the optimal decision policies and the maximum expected profits of both the retailer and the 
supplier in the presence of a required service level. By benchmarking the case without bidirectional option 
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contracts, we prove that the total order quantity will be increased by the retailer, the production will be 
arranged more flexibly, and more benefit will be gained by the two parties after using bidirectional option 
contracts in the presence of a service requirement. Hence, when there is a service requirement, the members 
of a supply chain can better optimize their decisions and enhance their profits through the adoption of 
bidirectional option contracts. 
Observation 3: Our finding also shows that the service level has a significant impact on the maximum 
expected profits of both the retailer and the supplier with or without bidirectional option contracts. With or 
without bidirectional option contracts, the maximum expected profit of the retailer is non-increasing in the 
service requirement while that of the supplier is non-decreasing in the service requirement. Hence, with or 
without bidirectional option contracts, the members of a supply chain must set an appropriate service target 
to balance the conflicts of interest in the presence of service requirement. 
Observation 4: We find that when there is a service requirement, the adoption of bidirectional option 
contracts can coordinate the channel. At this point, the coordination condition is independent with market 
demand distribution. Therefore, without the knowledge of the market demand distribution, the members can 
achieve the highest profits and the chain can achieve the maximum efficiency. This feature makes the 
implementation of the coordinating contracts easier in practice. 
This research makes several key contributions as follows. (1) Our work extends the existing literature 
on bidirectional option contracts by incorporating the service requirement into the model. We explore the 
effect of the service level on the supply chain with bidirectional option contracts. (2) Our research is different 
from most existing literature referring to bidirectional option contracts that only focus on its effect on the 
retailer’s ordering behavior. We assume that the supplier can arrange his production considering bidirectional 
option contracts by setting a parameter 𝑔 which denotes the supplier’s unit penalty cost involved in 
accelerating production or obtaining products from an alternative source. We explore the supplier’s 
production behavior with bidirectional option contracts and a required service level. We also examine the 
value of bidirectional option contracts on the performance of both the retailer and the supplier in the presence 
of a required service level. (3) The supplier is always assumed to use the make-to-order production strategy 
in most existing literature. At this point, the supply chain is coordinated through the unilateral coordination 
mechanism from the perspective of the retailer. However, with bidirectional option contracts the supplier can 
arrange his production schedule based on profit maximization principle. Our study complements to the 
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existing literature by designing the bilateral coordination mechanism from the perspective of both the retailer 
and the supplier. 
There are some future research directions that are worth considering. (1) it will be interesting to explore 
the effect of different types of option contracts on the supply chain and consider which type of option 
contracts is the best choice when there is a service requirement. (2) Both the retailer and the supplier are 
assumed to be risk-neutral in this paper. Another interesting direction is to consider different risk attitudes of 
the members, such as loss-averse supplier (Luo and Chen, 2015) or loss-averse retailer (Chen and Zhou, 
2015). (3) In this paper, we assume that the dominant position is taken by the supplier. Considering different 
supply chain power structures (Chen et al. 2015; Chen and Wang, 2015) is another interesting research 
avenue to be explored. (4) Similar to Zhao et al. (2013), in our study we consider the unit exercise price 
under the call options equals to that under the put options. Obviously, a particularly interesting issue is to 
consider separate parameters for exercising bidirectional options as call or put options. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
From (1), we derive that 𝜕𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1
= (𝑝 − 𝑤1) − (𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝐹(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑞1 − 𝑞2), 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1
2 =
−(𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝑓(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) < 0 , 
𝜕𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
= (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏) − (𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝐹(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) +
(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
2 = −(𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝑓(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) < 0 . Since 
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝑞2
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2𝜕𝑞1
= −(𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝑓(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) + (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) , we derive that |
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1
2
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝑞2
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2𝜕𝑞1
𝜕2𝜋𝑟(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1
2
| =
4(𝑝 − 𝑤2)(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑞1 + 𝑞2)𝑓(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) > 0. Obviously, the Hessian matrix of 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1, 𝑞2) is negative 
definite. Hence, 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1, 𝑞2) is jointly concave in 𝑞1 and 𝑞2.  
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Recalling (2), the retailer’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option contracts in the presence of 
service requirement is 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾, 𝑞2
∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞1
𝛾 + (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞2
∗ − (𝑝 − 𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞1
𝛾
+𝑞2
∗
0
− (𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞1
𝛾
−𝑞2
∗
0
𝑑𝑥  
Then we derive 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾
,𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑤1
= −𝑞1
𝛾 + (𝑝 − 𝑤1)
𝑑𝑞1
𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
+ (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)
𝑑𝑞2
∗
𝑑𝑤1
− (𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝐹(𝑞1
𝛾 + 𝑞2
∗)
𝑑(𝑞1
𝛾
+𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑤1
−
(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞2
∗)
𝑑(𝑞1
𝛾
−𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑤1
. 
(1)When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞2
∗ = 𝑞𝛾 − 𝑞1
𝛾
. Then 
24 
 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾
,𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑤1
= −𝑞1
𝛾 + [(𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑤1) − 2(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾)]
𝑑𝑞1
𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
+ [(𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏) − (𝑝 −
𝑤2)𝐹(𝑞
𝛾) + (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾)]
𝑑𝑞𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
= −𝑞1
𝛾 < 0  
In this case, 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾, 𝑞2
∗) is a decreasing function of 𝑤1.  
(2)When 𝛼 > 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞2
∗ = 𝑞𝛼 − 𝑞1
𝛾
. Then  
          
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾
,𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑤1
= −𝑞1
𝛾 + [(𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑤1) − 2(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛼)]
𝑑𝑞1
𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
 
                   < −𝑞1
𝛾 + [(𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑤1) − 2(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾)]
𝑑𝑞1
𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
= −𝑞1
𝛾 < 0 
In this case, 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾, 𝑞2
∗) is also a decreasing function of 𝑤1.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
From (8), we derive that 𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
= (𝑔 − 𝑐) − (𝑔 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑄) and 𝑑
2𝜋𝑠(𝑄)
𝑑𝑄2
= −(𝑔 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑄) < 0. Obviously, 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄) is concave in 𝑄.  
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
Recalling (9), the supplier’s maximum expected profit with bidirectional option contracts in the presence of 
service requirement is 
𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) = (𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑔)𝑞
∗ + (𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞1
𝛾 − (𝑤2 − 𝑔) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞∗
0
𝑑𝑥 + (𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
2𝑞1
𝛾
−𝑞∗
0
𝑑𝑥  
         +(𝑔 − 𝑐)𝑄∗ − (𝑔 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄∗
0
  
When 𝛼 > 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼. Then  
𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗)
𝑑𝑤1
= 𝑞1
𝛾 − [(𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑤1) − 2(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛼)]
𝑑𝑞1
𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
+ (𝑔 − 𝑠)[𝐹(𝑄𝜆) − 𝐹(𝑄∗)]
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝑤1
 
          > 𝑞1
𝛾 − [(𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑤1) − 2(𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾)]
𝑑𝑞1
𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
+ (𝑔 − 𝑠)[𝐹(𝑄𝜆) − 𝐹(𝑄∗)]
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝑤1
 
          = 𝑞1
𝛾 + (𝑔 − 𝑠)[𝐹(𝑄𝜆) − 𝐹(𝑄∗)]
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝑤1
 
If 𝑄𝜆 ≤ 𝑞1
𝛾
, we obtain that 𝑄∗ = 𝑞1
𝛾
, 𝑑𝑄
∗
𝑑𝑤1
< 0 and 𝐹(𝑄𝜆) ≤ 𝐹(𝑄∗). In this case, we derive that 𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗)
𝑑𝑤1
> 0. 
If 𝑞1
𝛾 < 𝑄𝜆 < 𝑞∗, we obtain that 𝑄∗ = 𝑄𝜆, 𝑑𝑄
∗
𝑑𝑤1
= 0 and 𝐹(𝑄𝜆) = 𝐹(𝑄∗). In this case, we derive that 
𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗)
𝑑𝑤1
> 0. If 𝑄𝜆 ≥ 𝑞∗, we obtain that 𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗, 𝑑𝑄
∗
𝑑𝑤1
= 0 and 𝐹(𝑄𝜆) > 𝐹(𝑄∗). In this case, we derive that 
𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗)
𝑑𝑤1
> 0.  
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Proof of Proposition 3 
Since 𝑏 < (𝑝−𝑤1)(𝑤2−𝑠)+(𝑝−𝑤2)(𝑤1−𝑠)
𝑝−𝑠
, we can derive that 𝛾 > 𝛽. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞0
∗ =
𝑞0
𝛽
. Since 𝑞𝛾 > 𝑞0
𝛽
, it follows that 𝑞∗ > 𝑞0
∗. If 𝛽 < 𝛼 < 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. Since 
𝑞𝛼 is an increasing function of 𝛼, 𝑞𝛼|𝛼=𝛽 = 𝑞0
𝛽
 and 𝑞𝛼|𝛼=𝛾 = 𝑞
𝛾, it follows that 𝑞∗ > 𝑞0
∗. If 𝛼 ≥ 𝛾, we 
obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. It follows that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞0
∗.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
First, we study the effect of bidirectional option contracts on the retailer’s maximum expected profit.  
Set ∆(𝑞2
∗) = 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗, 𝑞2
∗) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
∗) . Using (5) and (14), we derive that ∆(𝑞2
∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞2
∗ −
(𝑝 − 𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
∗+𝑞2
∗
0
− (𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞0
∗−𝑞2
∗
0
𝑑𝑥 + (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
∗
0
. 
(1)When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽 , we obtain 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞0
𝛽
 and 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 . Then, ∆(𝑞2
∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞2
∗ − (𝑝 −
𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
𝛽
+𝑞2
∗
0
− (𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
𝛽
−𝑞2
∗
0
+ (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
𝛽
0
  
Since ∆(0) = 0 and 𝑑∆(𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑞2
∗ |𝑞2∗=0 = (𝑝 − 𝑤2)[𝐹(𝑞
𝛾) − 𝐹(𝑞0
𝛽
)] − (𝑤2 − 𝑠)[𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾) − 𝐹(𝑞0
𝛽
)] > 0, we 
can deduce that ∆(𝑞2
∗) > 0. It follows that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
𝛽, 𝑞2
∗) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
𝛽
). Hence 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾 , 𝑞2
𝛾
) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
𝛽
).  
(2)When 𝛽 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾 , we obtain 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼  and 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 . Then, ∆(𝑞2
∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞2
∗ − (𝑝 −
𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞𝛼+𝑞2
∗
0
− (𝑤2 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞𝛼−𝑞2
∗
0
+ (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞𝛼
0
. Since ∆(0) = 0  and 𝑑∆(𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝑞2
∗ |𝑞2∗=0 =
(𝑝 − 𝑤2)[𝐹(𝑞
𝛾) − 𝐹(𝑞𝛼)] − (𝑤2 − 𝑠)[𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾) − 𝐹(𝑞𝛼)] > 0 , we can deduce that ∆(𝑞2
∗) > 0 . It 
follows that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
𝛼, 𝑞2
∗) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
𝛼). Hence 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾 , 𝑞2
𝛾
) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
𝛼).  
(3)When 𝛼 > 𝛾, we obtain 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼. Similarly to (2), we derive that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾, 𝑞2
𝛾
) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
𝛼).  
Now we study the effect of bidirectional option contracts on the supplier’s maximum expected profit.  
When 𝛼 > 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. Set ∆(𝑤1) = 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) − 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗). Using (10) and 
(16), we derive that ∆(𝑤1) = (𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑔)𝑞
𝛼 + (𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏)𝑞1
𝛾 − (𝑤2 − 𝑔) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞𝛼
0
𝑑𝑥 + (𝑤2 −
𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
2𝑞1
𝛾
−𝑞𝛼
0
𝑑𝑥 + (𝑔 − 𝑐)𝑄∗ − (𝑔 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄∗
0
− (𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑞
𝛼 . Set 𝑞1
𝛾
|
𝑤1=𝑤1
0 = 𝑞
𝛼 . If 𝑤1 = 𝑤1
0 
then 𝑞2
𝛾 = 0 , 𝑞𝛾 = 𝑞1
𝛾 = 𝑞𝛼  and 𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛼 , which yields ∆(𝑤1
0) = 0 . Notice 𝑑∆(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1
|𝑤1=𝑤10 > (𝑔 −
𝑠)[𝐹(𝑄𝜆) − 𝐹(𝑄∗)]𝑑𝑄
∗
𝑑𝑤1
. If 𝑄𝜆 ≤ 𝑞1
𝛾
, we obtain that 𝐹(𝑄𝜆) ≤ 𝐹(𝑄∗)  and 𝑑𝑄
∗
𝑑𝑤1
< 0 , which yields 
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𝑑∆(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1
|𝑤1=𝑤10 > 0 . Hence 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) > 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) . If 𝑄𝜆 > 𝑞1
𝛾
, we obtain that 𝑑𝑄
∗
𝑑𝑤1
= 0 , which yields 
𝑑∆(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1
|𝑤1=𝑤10 > 0. Hence 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) > 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗). Hence, 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) > 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗). Similarly, when 𝛽 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾  and 
𝛼 ≤ 𝛽 it follows that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) > 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗).  
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
First, we consider the effect of service level on the retailer’s maximum expected profit.  
When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞2
∗ = 𝑞𝛾 − 𝑞1
𝛾
. In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾, 𝑞2
∗) is a 
constant function of 𝛼. When 𝛼 > 𝛾, we obtain that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞2
∗ = 𝑞𝛼 − 𝑞1
𝛾
. Then  
       
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾
,𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝛼
= [(𝑝 − 𝑤2 − 𝑏) − (𝑝 − 𝑤2)𝐹(𝑞
𝛼) + (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛼)]𝑑𝑞
𝛼
𝑑𝛼
 
              = {(𝑝 − 𝑤2)[𝐹(𝑞
𝛾) − 𝐹(𝑞𝛼)] − (𝑤2 − 𝑠)[𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾) − 𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛼)]}𝑑𝑞
𝛼
𝑑𝛼
 
Since 𝐹(𝑞𝛾) < 𝐹(𝑞𝛼), 𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛾) > 𝐹(2𝑞1
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛼) and 𝑑𝑞
𝛼
𝑑𝛼
> 0, we obtain that 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾
,𝑞2
∗ )
𝑑𝛼
< 0. In this 
case, we derive that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞1
𝛾 , 𝑞2
∗) is a decreasing function of 𝛼.  
Now we consider the effect of service level on the supplier’s maximum expected profit. 
When 𝑄𝜆 < 𝑞∗, we derive that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is a constant function of 𝛼. When 𝑄𝜆 ≥ 𝑞∗, we obtain 𝑄∗ =
𝑞∗. If 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾 and 𝑄𝜆 ≥ 𝑞𝛾, we obtain 𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛾. In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is a constant function 
of 𝛼 . If 𝛼 > 𝛾  and 𝑄𝜆 ≥ 𝑞𝛼 , we obtain 𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛼 . Then 𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗)
𝑑𝛼
= (𝑔 − 𝑠)[𝐹(𝑄𝜆) − 𝐹(𝑞𝛼)]𝑑𝑞
𝛼
𝑑𝛼
. Since 
𝐹(𝑄𝜆) ≥ 𝐹(𝑞𝛼) and 𝑑𝑞
𝛼
𝑑𝛼
> 0, we obtain 𝑑𝜋𝑠(𝑞
𝛼)
𝑑𝛼
≥ 0. In this case, we derive that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is a increasing 
function of 𝛼.  
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
From (17), we derive that 𝑑Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼)
𝑑𝑄𝐼
= (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑐) − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑄𝐼) and 
𝑑2Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼)
𝑑𝑄𝐼
2 = −(𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑄𝐼) <
0. Obviously, Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼) is strictly concave in 𝑄𝐼.  
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
Both the retailer’s order quantity and the supplier’s production quantity need coordinate. Only when 𝜆 = 𝛾 
is satisfied, the supplier has a motivation to manufacture the same quantity as in the coordinated supply chain. 
Then, we obtain that 
𝑔−𝑐
𝑔−𝑠
=
2𝑝−𝑤1−𝑤2−𝑏
2𝑝−2𝑤2
. Since 𝜏 =
𝑝+𝑔−𝑐
𝑝+𝑔−𝑠
>
𝑔−𝑐
𝑔−𝑠
= 𝜆, we obtain that 𝜏 > 𝜆 ≡ 𝛾. Therefore, 
27 
 
only when 𝛼 =
𝑝+𝑔−𝑐
𝑝+𝑔−𝑠
 is satisfied, the retailer has a motivation to purchase the same quantity as in the 
coordinated supply chain. With some algorithm, we get 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 − 𝑏 +
2(1−𝛼)(𝑝+𝑔−𝑠)(𝑝−𝑤2)
𝑔−𝑠
, which is the 
sufficient condition for the channel coordination with bidirectional option contracts and a service 
requirement.  
